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Abstract 
Artisanal and small-scale (ASM) sector employs as many as four million people in sub-
Saharan Africa. Over 200,000 people in Ghana alone are engaged in mining diamonds and 
gold at small-scale level. ASM is an important economic sector and income generating 
activity of rural and urban populations. However, the sector is also associated with adverse 
impacts on the natural environment, irresponsible mining techniques, social and health 
problems, dangerous working conditions, gender discrimination, conflicts between illegal 
ASM operators and large-scale mining companies, child labour and criminal element. Various 
international organizations have implemented a series of initiatives with an aim to address 
institutional, technological and environmental problems of the ASM sector in Ghana. Based 
on the analysis of documents and semi-structured interviews, the paper uses institutional 
analysis and collective action as conceptual frameworks to examine the success of such cross-
border initiatives and their impact on the governance of the ASM sector in Ghana. The Paper 
also discusses how other initiatives involving local actors are developing in Ghana. 
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Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) - in this chapter defined as artisanal mining of 
mineral resourced conducted on a small-scale by individuals or groups of miners using 
rudimentary techniques – is a global industry that supports the livelihood of 13 million people 
worldwide, through a significant share of ASM operations are conducted informally. In sub-
Saharan Africa ASM employs as many as four million people and 200,000 of them work in 
Ghana, where often unregistered miners operate gold and diamond mines. In Ghana, ASM is 
a growing sector and important income generating opportunity that attracts workers from 
around the country and neighbouring states. However, the sector has been also associated 
with many adverse impacts on the natural environment, irresponsible mining techniques, 
social and health problems, dangerous working conditions, gender discrimination, child 
labour and criminal element, and conflicts between illegal ASM operators and large-scale 
mining companies. With the assistance from international organizations, from 1989 to 2009, 
the Government of Ghana and the mining industry have implemented various initiatives to 
address some of these institutional, technological and environmental problems in the ASM 
sector, with the overarching aim of improving the governance of the ASM sector. However, 
the outcomes of these initiatives were disappointing both in terms of the specific challenges 
targeted and in terms of improved governance in the sector. By 2009, all these major 
programs have been completed or downsized but the ASM sector still remained largely 
unregulated and highly conflictive, with frequent, sometimes violent, confrontations over the 
exploitation of mineral resources between mining multinationals and informal small-scale 
miners or “galamsey”1. 
 
                                                 
1 Galamsey is the local term for informal small-scale mining, it derives from the expression “get all and sell it”. 
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The chapter aims to understand why improving governance in the ASM has been so 
challenging and why major multi-stakeholder initiatives promoted in the sector by 
international organizations (World Bank, United Nations, GTZ) did not succeed. 
Methodologically, the chapter uses analysis of legislation and policy reports from 
international organizations to complement field observation and interpretative analysis of 26 
in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted with a range of key actors in ASM sector in 
Ghana from 2005 to 2008. The chapter first describes the context of ASM in Ghana, 
presenting in more detail its history, the governance challenges faced by the sector and finally 
outlining the above-mentioned multi-stakeholder governance initiatives. This is followed by 
the introduction of the theoretical framework: “new institutionalism” (Paavola, 2007; Ostrom, 
2005; Polski and Ostrom, 1999), and its relevance to study the problems faced by 
collaborative initiatives targeting ASM governance challenges. The analysis section evaluated 
the governance system in Ghana and the reasons for the failure of multi-stakeholder initiatives 
using the lens of new institutionalism. Finally, the discussions section relates the initiatives’ 
shortcomings with major structural issues taking place in Ghana: the transitions from 




Ghana is one of the largest gold producers in Africa; gold production contributes 5% to 
country’s gross domestic product and 37% to exports. Since 1990s, the investment in the 
Ghana’s mining sector has been dominated by foreign companies; and, in 2008, over 200 
mining companies were awarded mining leases and exploration rights by the Government 
(Boon & Ababio, 2009). However, the tradition of artisanal gold mining in Ghana dates 
hundreds of years back, before the establishment of a legal regime for mining operations in 
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the country (Hilson, 2002). The legal regime for mining operations in Ghana is divided into 
two parts: the first was established for large-scale mining operations and the second was 
drawn for small-scale mining. The large-scale mining regime was established in 1986 by the 
Minerals and Mining Law (PNDCL 153) soon after the Government of Ghana launched the 
National Recovery Plan in 1983, following the guidance of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (Hilson, 2002). In the wave of IMF assisted liberalisation of investment regimes, 
Ghana too has liberalised its investment regime aiming to attract foreign direct investment 
into exploitation of country’s mineral resources. The new legislation has permitted tax 
reductions, breaks, variable royalties (3-12%), reduced corporate tax (35%), removed 
restrictions for dividend transfer and reduced import duties to encourage start-ups of large-
scale mining enterprises (Hilson, 2002; Akpalu & Parks, 2007). 
 
The regulatory regime for small-scale mining was formed 1989 with the Small-Scale Mining 
Law (PNDCL 218), which began to formalize artisanal mining activities proveisouly part of 
the informal economy (Appiah, 1998; Hilson & Potter, 2003; Yakovleva, 2007; Hilson, 
2010a). The three year delay between the Mineral and Mining Law and the Small-Scale 
Mining Law created a regulatory void during which informal small-scale mining, following 
the global rise in gold prices, has expanded significantly. In the course of the 1990s and 
2000s, the ASM sector in Ghana continued its rapid growth and lealized, i.e. formally 
regisering as small-scale miners with licences and permits acquiring plots for mining actiities 
accroding to the small-scale regulation (Banchirigah, 2008). A substantial share of the ASM 
sector, however,  remained informal (Aubynn, 2009) conducted by “galamasey”: unregistered 
small-scale miners on land plots without official permission. The galamsey groups have been 
a great concern for the country’s regulatory system and its enforecement authorities, as they 
tend to conduct their mining activities on plots that have been designated to other users, often 
5 
 
large-scale mining companies, which acquired their concessions for exploration and mining 
activities under the legal regime for the large-scale mining operations.  
 
Apart from the complexities of the legal regime for large-scale and small-scale mining, Ghana 
has two major co-existing land regimes – state land regime (regulated by land legislation and 
enforced by state authorities) and customary land regime (regulated by ancient tradition and 
enforced by local chiefs). Whilst large-scale mining enterprises (often multinationals) and 
registered small-scale miners are operating under the state land regime to access mineral 
resources, whereby mineral rights and land rights are allocated the state; “galamsey” are 
operating under the customary land regime, whereby they access mineral resources with a 
permission of local chiefs to operate on land plots traditionally belonging to certain 
chiefdoms. Obviously, the latter group of mineral resource uses are violating the state-
imposed land and mineral rights regime; and contributing to conflict around access to 
resources between the state, large-scale mining enterprises and informal small-scale miners. 
 
Besides the existing conflict between mining parties, the ASM sector in Ghana is associated 
with adverse impacts on the natural environment  and human health due to improper use of 
mercury and other chemicals in mineral recovery, irresponsible mining techniques (i.e. mines 
are often left abandoned without proper re-cultivation, officially small-scale miners are not 
allowed to use blasting, a prohibition often overlooked which leads to greater damage to 
natural landscapes), social and health problems, dangerous working conditions, gender 
discrimination, child labour and security issues (Hilson, 2006, 2010; Hilson & Yakovleva, 
2007; Yakovleva, 2007). The governance of the minerals sector has been further affected by 
institutional weaknesses in the area of environmental management and regulation, as the 
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Environmental Protection Agency Act was passed by Ghanaian Parliament only in 1994; 8 
years after the enactment of the Mineral and Mining Law (Akpalu & Parks, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, several major initiatives supported by international organizations were 
designed and implemented during the course of 1989-2009 with the overarching aim to 
improve the governance of the ASM sector in Ghana, specifically targeting regularization, 
pollution, institutional development and policy support in the small-scale gold mining sector. 
The initiatives analyzed in this chapter include: 1) Small-Scale Mining Project; 2) Mining 
Sector Development and Environment Project; 3) Prestea Action Plan; 4) Alternative 
Livelihood Project; and 5) Abatement of Mercury Pollution Programme2. 
 
As Table 1 shows, the assessment of the outcomes of these programs ranged from moderately 
satisfactory to less than satisfactory, partial and total failure (World Bank, 2003). Academic 
literature was less generous with all the programs (see Hilson & Yakovleva, 2007; Styles et 
al, 2010; Telmer & Veiga, 2008). Hilson (2010b) highlighted many governance failures 
remaining after the programs came to an end. It proved extremely difficult to bring the sector 
under regulation, register all small-scale miners, distribute land plots, effectively oversee 
environmental and health impacts, prevent human rights violations against local communities 
and provide alternative lifestyles to farmers expelled from sites. Besides, a government 
official interviewed for this research suggested there are much more informal mining that 
those formally registered, which constituted a significant challenge for the governance, 
                                                 
2 Besides, other multi-stakeholders initiatives have had an impact on small-scale operations in Ghana, such as: 
Diamond Sector Reform Programme supported by the United Stated Agency for International Development 
(USAID); Compendium of Best Practice in the Small-Scale Mining developed by the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); Global Dialogue; Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme; and Diamond Development Initiative International. These initiatives are excluded 
from the analysis as they address broader geographical areas, minerals commodities, issues and topics 
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workers, legal operators and local communities and escalated into incidents of expulsion of 
galamsey with force leading to violence.  
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




The new institutional approach to environmental governance3 (Paavola, 2007; Gibson et al, 
2005) suggests that governance is best understood as the establishment, affirmation, or change 
of institutions to resolve conflicts over the use of resources. To date, new institutional 
research has focused on governance of common-pool resources – i.e., forests, pastures, 
fisheries – with which the governance of mineral resources in Ghana shares two defining 
attributes: rivalry over consumption and difficulty of exclusion. Institutions resolve conflict 
by striking a balance between conflicting interests. A governance solution is the particular 
configuration of exclusions, entitlements and institutional rules underlying the decided 
balance of conflicting interests (Ostrom, 2005)4. 
 
                                                 
3 This approach calls to extend analysis from common pool resources to other kinds of resources. It also extends 
the use of institutional nalayis from local (i.e., local common property arrangements) and international domains 
of application (i.e., environmental conventions) to all governance solutions, including national environmental 
and natural resource use policies and multi-level governance solutions (Paavola, 2007).  
4 Institutional Analysis focuses on individuals (individual actors) or organisations (collective actors) which make 
decisions over a course of action (Ostrom, 2005). Actors interact with each other in ‘action situations’ leading to 
certain outcomes which are bounded by context exogenous variable such as biophysical and material conditions, 
attributes of the community, institutions and rules-in-useAttributes of the community are “the values of behavior 
generally accepted in a community; the level of common understanding that potential participants share (or do 
not share) about the particular types of action arenas; the extent of homogeneity in the preferences of those 
living. in a community; the size and composition of the relevant community; and the extent of inequality of basic 
assets among those affected” (Ostrom, 2005: 26-27). In trun, rules are  conceptualised as “the set of instructions 
for creating an action situation in a particular environment” (Ostrom, 2005: 17) 
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Rules can be formal (laws, regulations etc) and informal (how things are done, cutural and 
religous codes of conduct), Paavola (2007) identifis four types of rules shaping the intreaction 
between the actors:  
- Rules of exclusion define how unauthorised uses of a resource can be excluded. 
- Rules of entitlement asign actors the rights to use a resource and create hyerarchies of 
rights and accepted uses, these can have implications for government outcomes and 
distribution of benefits of resource use.  
- Monitoring rules determine what is monitored and by whom. 
- Decision-making rules configure which actors entitled to make decisions, the 
procedures they should follow and whose interests should be balanced/prioritised 
when making a decision.  
 
Rules define what actions are “required, prohibited, or permitted and the sanctions authorized 
if the rules are not followed” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 38). A well-designed system of rules provides 
the support for seven ‘governance functions’ that should be fulfilled to warrant successful 
outcomes: 1) Exclusion of unauthorized actors, 2) Regulation of uses and distribution of 
benefits, 3) Provisioning and recovery of costs, 4) Monitoring, 5) Enforcement, 6) Conflict  
resolution, and 7) Collective choice. The Table 2 expands on these functions with examples of 
their application in the ASM sector. Three main types of governance solutions, i.e. state-
based, community-based and co-management respond to particular configuration of 
aforementioned governance functions and rules (Paavola, 2007).  
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Finally, there are three successive and interrelated governance levels or functional tiers of 
governance where the fulfilment of functions should be consistently aligned by governance 
solutions: operational, collective choice and constitutional choice (Ostrom, 2005; Paavola, 
2007). The functional tiers are governed by corresponding rules (Di Gregorio et al, 2008; 
Nicholson, 1993). Outcomes of the constitutional level are the results of decisions about how 
collective choice actors are selected and which patterns of interaction will define relationship 
among participants of the collective choice body (e.g. voting rules and representation). At the 
collective choice level, authorized actors make choices interpreting the outcomes of the 
constitutional level (i.e., who is entitled to use a resource and how) and the rules they follow 
in making such decisions are institutional rules. The operational level of governance includes 
the rules of decision-making on day-to-day activities that affect the physical world directly 
within the constraints of operations rules which define choices set. Paavola (2007) suggests 
that the choice of governance solutions is a matter of social justice rather than economic 
efficiency, emphasizing the importance of governance solutions that can accommodate private 
ownership and collective ownership.  
 
4. Methodology 
The research used both secondary and primary data. Secondary data from international 
organizations and policy reports and regulation was used to make a preliminary assessment of 
multi-stakeholder programs. To investigate the sector in depth and the reasons for 
failure/success of the programs, 26 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key actors 
in the ASM sector in Ghana in 2005 and 2008 (see Table 3). The interviews lasted between 
one and two hours. Interview topics included sustainable livelihoods, challenges of the ASM 
sector, conflict between small- and large-scale mining actors and success of multi-stakeholder 
governance initiatives. Interviews were recorded with a permission of respondents and later 
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transcribed. The transcripts were coded focusing on three core aspects of Pavola’s (2007) 
framework: 1) functional and structural tiers of governance institutions; 2) governance 
functions and their organisation; 3) formulation of key institutional rules. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





5.1. Governance of ASM  
According to Paavola (2007), governance solutions require promotion of procedural justice 
which is concerned with the following questions:  
1) Which parties and whose interests are recognised and how? 
2) Which parties can participate and how? 
3) What is the effective distribution of power? 
 
Our analysis reveals that major parties or actors involved in the governance of the ASM 
sector are: registered small-scale miners; informal small-scale miners (workers and groups 
who are not legally registered as small-scale miners and/or who conduct operations on plots 
which are not legally allocated to them to lead mining activities); members of the small-scale 
mining value chain (financiers, buyers and equipment suppliers); customary land owners 
(chiefs and individuals); other land users (farmers, etc); large-scale mining companies; local 
communities around both the mines; members of a network formed around the small-scale 
mining (suppliers and vendors, etc); national government and its departments at national, 
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regional and local level; local municipal authorities; nongovernmental and civil society 
organizations (NGOs); large-scale mining companies and their associations; and international 
organizations. 
 
We find that the current governance of the ASM sector has set the rules of exclusion that 
define who are formal and informal small-scale miners. Entitlement rules have also been put 
in place, these are procedures for registration of small-scale mining operations, licensing and 
permitting. Although a system has been put in place to monitor the operations of small-scale 
mining sector, it only extends to registered miners and cannot effectively monitor informal 
mining operators. Finally, informal small-scale miners are excluded from influencing the 
decision concerning use of minerals, land and other natural resources. The distribution of 
power attempted by governance functions aimed to transfer power from the customary land 
use regime to the state-based regime. To this end, governance rules disempowered 
communities, customary authorities, small-scale miners and galamsey, while empowering the 
central government, large companies, and supranational institutions such as the World Bank 
and a select number of international NGOs. 
 
The analysis of levels of governance reveals weaknesses in procedural justice and a 
substantial lack of alignment between actors and governance rules in each level. As a result, 
the distribution of power is ineffective as evidenced by the steady spread of galamsey activity 
and large companies’ importance to protect their concessions from galamsey occupation. 
Indeed, incidences of expulsion of galamsey with force leading to violence are just the surface 
of an increasingly antagonistic pattern of relationship between major actors in the mining 
sector (government, registered small-scale miners, large-scale miners, unregistered small-
scale miners, customary authorities) that leads to social injustice (exclusion of small-scale 
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miners from legal access to mineral resources and over-exposure to environmental and health 
risks and violence). This antagonism is the expression of a social divide brewing social 
injustice in the form of the exclusion of small-scale miners from access to mineral resources, 
the expulsion of farmers by new concession holders and the denial of traditional knowledge 
and norms and the exposure of communities to violence and environmental risks.  
 
Constitutional level rules – legislation- attempted to reduce the agency of customary 
authorities as described by the interviewee: “Chiefs, their problem is that they do not have 
control of the concession, you see once the concession has given to the mine, the chief does 
not have any authority whatsoever” (Manager of mining company 3, 2005). 
 
In addition, constitutional rules they deny traditional knowledge and exclude small-scale 
miners’ interest from the design of formal rules for land allocation. This creates both 
incentives for illegal mining and a regulation enforcement void that makes “formal actors” 
unable to prevent and control illegal activities.  
“Now, if somebody goes into your concession and you report it to the chief, he has no 
authority to stop them coming. Indeed, the chiefs are often behind the illegal miners. 
Some chiefs took into their hand the authority to license small grounds to some 
groups” (Manager of mining company 1, 2008). 
 
“In the Awaso area, the police had been bought by the illegal miners, so in the end 
they had to bring in the military but this something us we would never do because the 
Ngo’s already want some excuse to tarnish the image of registered mining 




At the institutional level, formal processes reinforce injustices and create incentives for illegal 
mining through cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, high registration fees and limited 
availability of suitable areas for small-scale mining.  
“If you ask galamsey to pay 60000 cedis before they begin their activities they cannot 
do it” (Government official 4, 2005). 
 
“The areas given for small-scale mining have not been explored, we do not know if 
there is any gold there; and there is no funding to hire universities. Small-scale miners 
are not allowed doing prospection and there is thius perception that all good 
goldfields are in concessions.  So, why people would pay a license to work where 
there is no gold? They will go and find it in a concession, but if you are mining in 
somebody’s land we cannot give you a license” (Officer from Minerals Commission, 
2008).  
 
An additional incentive for informal mining was the lack of mechanisms to chanell financial 
support for ASM miners. Neither public nor other institutional funds are available in the 
country to support ASM activities “…financial support for small-scale miners.. is on case to 
case basis… they want to work systematically over a long period then they can actually make 
their case and present a request” (Government officer 5, Ghana, 2005).  
 
However, governance is achieved through informal institutions leading to incipient co-
management solutions. Despite regulatory attempts to marginalize customary authorities, both 
galamsey and companies acknowledged some degree of agency of local chiefs to deliver 




“Some chiefs took into their hand the authority to license small grounds to some 
groups.  You have to make an agreement to give him some formal authority to act in 
your behalf.  It depends on how influential the chief is. If the chief is influential he will 
use his authority to discourage or to persuade people from going into their lands” 
(Manager of mining company 2, 2008).  
 
Local communities also provide private investors to fund small-scale-mining, although at very 
high rates. At the operational level, formal rules and state representatives reject all interaction 
with galamsey- even for humanitarian purposes: “The galamsey mandate is one of an illegal 
operator, operating on somebody’s concession. So if you go there and advise the person then 
it means that you are glorifying illegality and that is dangerous” (Government official 3, 
Ghana, 2005). However, some companies successfully managed cooperative interactions with 
galamseys. The analysis reveal the development of bottom-up approaches to governance from 
the operational level, where a conjunction of day-to-day realities “The reality is that you live 
with that problem, you need to interact with them and relate to them in the best possible way” 
(Manager mining company 1, 2005) and external constraints (image, international pressures) 
forces companies to interact and negotiate use of lands with informal miners and local chiefs.  
“You need to know how to talk and engage the galamsey. They must trust you, you 
must be seen doing something for the community. We actually helped them in the day-
to-day of doing galamsey, we help them increase recovery and move away from the 
use of mercury, we develop alternative programmes with them, even let them know 
that we can get some of them working on the main mine “Because we have good 
relationships with them, everytime they have tried to go into a particular concession 
we have been able to persuade them. We have also the fear of becoming a suction 
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point for other miners, but it was the opposite, our miners fed-off new entrants to 
protect their relationship with us” (Manager mining company 1, 2005).  
 
However, changes need to reach the constitutional level to provide stable governance. In a 
well-functioning governance system, actors can move among the different levels, looking for 
the best outcomes within a given set of rules or bargaining to shape collective or 
constitutional choice rules to their benefit. The review of the governance system of the ASM 
sector in Ghana reveals that the party that both affects the sector and is affected by the 
governance – informal small-scale mining operators – are largely excluded from decision-
making and power distribution.  
 
6. Multi-stakeholders initiatives 
The interviews revealed a consistent perception of failure of these initiatives at the operational 
level. Our analysis suggests that failures at the operational level were indeed a result of 
combination of weaknesses of governance solutions at the constitutional, institutional and 
operational levels. In all the programs, legislation at the constitutional level was taken as a 
given. Therefore, the exclusion of galamsey from land use resulting regulation, cascaded 
down to institutional and operational level solutions that explicitly denied galamsey the rights 
to access information or participate in consultation. In many cases, there was also a 
misalignment between institutional and operational solutions, associated in many cases with 
intention of supra-national institutions and some companies to enforce a variety of rules of 
exclusion of local actors, from attempts to impose one-size-fits-all policies, to red-tape and 
explicit denial to acknowledge agency or entity customary authorities. We will briefly analyse 




6.1. Constitutional and Institutional Levels Weaknesses 
The Small-Scale Mining Project (SSMP) reveal asymmetries at the constitutional level in the 
design of programs in terms of the effective distribution of power between the funding 
institutions (World Bank and GTZ) and the Ghanaian government. The government had 
limited say in terms of decision-making rules, from the design of the initiative, to selection of 
areas of intervention and appointment of experts. As a consequence, Government 
representatives criticized the project as being broad focus without due consideration of the 
local context. As a solution, Government representatives expressed a desire to narrow the 
focus of initiatives for specific geographical areas, which would take into account local 
conditions of mining and operations of the ASM sector in Ghana, as suggested by one of the 
Government officials:  “it’s not emeralds in Zambia – it’s gold mining in Ghana” 
(Government official 2, 2008). 
 
Mining Sector Development and Environment Project targeted the constitutional and 
institutional functional levels but its reach at the operational level was limited. Although the 
initiative was discontinued by 2009, it played an important role as a founding initiative that 
assisted the development of the governing system of the ASM sector in Ghana. However, the 
criticism from interviewees highlighted the failure to address the critical governance function: 
provisioning and recovery of cost, both at the constitutional, institutional and operational 
levels. At the operational level, in terms of provision of funding for small-scale mining, the 
miners were keen to register. At the institutional and constitutional levels, in terms of 
resourcing the institutions, dealing with small-scale mining within the Government of Ghana, 




 “To be honest with you, I think that the EU and World Bank projects in relation to the 
small-scale miners have been more of a lip service because if you go down the small-
scale mining department of the Minerals Commission it is the weakest link of the 
Minerals Commission...They do not have the resources. It is the weakest link because, 
you see, they are reluctant to deliver and also assert authority in the case of finances 
and they are the least resourced.” (Academic, University of Ghana, 2008). 
 
6.1.1. Institutional and Operational Level Weaknesses 
Prestea Action Plan is a powerful example of how ill-designed exclusion and decision-
making rules can hinder governance functions, in this particular case conflict resolution, 
distribution of benefits and exclusion of unauthorized users. The plan aimed to impose a 
strictly state-based governance solution for the conflict arising out of the occupation of 
Prestea mine by hundreds of galamsey. However, the government lacked information to 
provide the fair system of regulation of uses and distribution of benefits (providing alternative 
suitable areas for small-scale exploration). The government did not have resources, nor the 
will to continuously monitor the uses and enforce the exclusion rules. Critically, the 
government did not have the technical information and resources to fund the survey to 
identify areas feasible for small-scale mining.  
 
Small-scale miners were not entitled to carry on their own explorations while galamsey 
communities were not consulted concerning the attractiveness of proposed areas for mining. 
As a consequence, although the workers were initially removed from the concession of the 
large-scale company (with intervention of armed units), the small-scale miners did not take up 
areas that were identified by the Government for them. Instead, they scattered to other areas 
continuing the informal operations, spreading conflict with other mining multinationals and 
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ultimately returning to the concession. The government officials and others now voice an idea 
that correspond to Pavvola’s co-management governance solution. Large-scale mining can go 
alongside small-scale mining through voluntary agreements at the operational level. These 
agreements can be negotiated by companies with galamsey operating on concessions as 
commented by the following interviewee:  
“If you allow the small-scale miners to come to that place they will go beyond their 
bounds and then affect the large concession that you have, because of that you are 
denying them. But I believe that if they sit the small-scale miners down in and said 
that yes we have actually cordoned off this area for your operations. We have 
provided you with the technical systems so that you can actually operate very 
efficiently. Stay there and leave the bigger concession for us to work on I believe that 
system will work because it has been tried and tested at Awaso and it has worked so I 
know can also work elsewhere.“ (Government official 6, 2008). 
 
Alternative Livelihood Project. In 2005, most of the state and private sector interviewees 
praised potential of Alternative Livelihood Projects to improve governance and solve conflict 
by creating new sources of income in the ASM sector. However, by 2008, the enthusiasm had 
petered out and livelihood projects were hardly mentioned by the government representatives 
and companies. Despite good intentions, this outcome was almost inevitable. From the onset, 
the effectiveness of livelihood initiatives launched in the mining communities had been 
heavily criticized by local NGOs and local communities. One of the aims of providing skills 
for local communities in mining areas was to deter from joining the informal mining activities 
by providing them with skills to pursue productive employment and earning opportunities in 
other sectors. However, the interviews revealed a widespread failure both at the institutional 
level (lack of assessment of community attributes and needs, neglect of dominant informal 
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rules, habits and capabilities) and operational level (implementation, engagement and scale 
up). The governance solutions underlying livelihood projects were particularly wanting in 
terms of justice in the distribution of benefits and enabling collective choice to decide how to 
compensate those excluded from the use of land. Farmers displaced from their traditional 
lands by large-scale mining operations or aspiring artisanal miners were denied access to 
concession areas and did not generally benefit from the skills programs, as reported by a local 
NGO:  
“You see our people… are farmers and then you take away agriculture from them and 
then you tell them that I want you to be a fish farmer…picking snails…collecting 
leaves for wrapping food… this is work for women… tell them that shift from 
agriculture now go into grass cutter rearing, or go into snail farming… which lives 
wild in Ghana. Should the farmer go into soap making and compete in the open 
market with Lever Brothers, with multinational companies… We can get involved in 
any form of sustainable livelihood but the grass cutters will need grass and it’s not 
available to them.” (NGO officer, 2005). 
 
Abatement of Mercury Pollution Program was developed by United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) in cooperation with the Ghanaian and Tanzanian 
Governments which participated in its design and operationalization. It aimed to eradicate 
pollution and poisoning following the use of mercury by ASM miners. The program failure 
can be traced to two main reasons. As in all other programs end users were excluded from the 
design of solutions and decision-making (formal and informal ASM miners). In addition, the 
program was oriented only at the operational level of governance but failed to address how 
operational level aspects connected with institutional level through supply chain of mercury in 
the artisanal gold mining. As reported by a local NGO in 2005:  
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“Community people do not import chemicals, they do not import mercury. So if there’s 
still mercury in the system the Government [should] make sure that when it finds the 
use of mercury, mining companies dispose of them properly. And what are they doing 
with them if they do not dispose of them? So, I think it’s something that someone 
should investigate. The link between the use of mercury by galamsey people and the 
mining companies.” (NGO officer, 2005). 
 
6.2. Discussion: The Reasons for Failure of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives and ASM 
Governance 
The implementation of governance initiatives examined in this chapter followed a logical 
pattern. The early initiatives were mostly focusing on establishing the constitutional 
arrangements, moving onto the institutional arrangements and the most recent ones 
introducing the initiatives that targeted the operational level of governance. Although the 
growth of the informal gold mining sector persisted throughout the 2000s, and most of the 
initiatives to some extent failed to deliver the expected outcomes, we cannot dismiss these 
initiatives as the total failure as they were introduced and implemented in the circumstances 
of almost total absence of formal governance rules. It is a gradual process. By building the 
system from top to bottom, each initiative was building on the previous one, accumulating 
more experience, building on evidence and resources constructed during the preceding 
initiatives. It is evident that these initiatives were linked to one another and as a positive 
feature, these initiatives did not ignore previous interventions and experiences. In isolation, 
none of them were delivered to the full success but together they can be seen as gradual steps 
in building a formal system for the ASM governance. The close examination of the 
governance initiatives reveals several design and implementation flaws, and if addressed can 




The analysis of governance conditions and multi-stakeholder programs aimed at solving the 
problems of the ASM sector demonstrates the underlying structural problem: constitutional 
rules exclude customary authorities and create a vicious circle of exclusion of galamsey. The 
initiatives that were designed to address the challenges of the ASM sector (spanning to both 
to formal and informal sides of it) have mainly failed to incorporate the informal users in its 
development and implementation. 
 
As a consequence, the voice of small-scale miners and their day-to-day problems and realities 
have been excluded from the design of multi-stakeholder programs providing basic training 
on environmental and health and safety issues or aiming to develop alternative livelihoods to 
mining. Unsurprisingly, these programs failed.  Indeed, it was not only galamsey who were 
excluded from the important governance functions in these programs.  The programs did not 
consider the roles and influences of key players in the political economy of informal mining 
such as chiefs, vendors, suppliers and financiers of small-scale-mining who were also 
ignored. Constitutional decisions followed the donor’s agenda and donor’s priorities (e.g. 
decisions such as who is considered an expert, where the programmes were focused, what 
problems were targeted and what solutions implemented).  Local stakeholders were only 
involved in the collective action and operational level, within the rules of interaction and 
procedures defined by the donor.  As a result, local stakeholders seem to think that these 
programmes often had a hidden agenda to benefit donors (e.g. paying foreign experts and 
buying foreign technology) and are not satisfied with the outcomes of collaboration to solve 




As a case in point the extracts from an interview with Minerals Commission officer that 
collaborated with GTZ exemplifies problems highlighted in most programmes. Problems 
affecting collaboration included perceived lack of transparency: “I don’t think we derived 
much from GTZ. I mean the funding the German government provided. They never made us 
aware of how much money was going to the project and they would bring their so-called 
expert and said, oh this man is here for 24 months. How much are you paying that person? 
Nobody knows” (Officer from Minerals Commission of Ghana, 2008).  
 
The second most important drawback of the program design was a failure to draw on local 
expertise and distrust of legitimacy of offered expertise as indicated by interviewee:  
“They brought some German pumps, whether those pumps can really do the work 
satisfactorily for the miners on the ground is for me and you to judge. Most of them I 
would say never performed. In fact, just a waste of resources” (Officer from Minerals 
Commission of Ghana, 2008). 
 
“They don’t do small-scale mining in Germany. They don’t mine gold there. They 
mine coal and they bring a coal expert and tell you that person is an expert in gold 
small-scale mining. That’s unheard of!” (Officer from Minerals Commission of 
Ghana, 2008).  
 
From the institutional perspective, the current challenges of the ASM cannot be resolved by 
multi-stakeholder agreements, where the agenda is decided by the northern donor and is 
underpinned by state-centric governance rules.  The challenges of the ASM are attributed to a 
transition from ASM problems from community-based management of resources, such as 
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customary regulation of land and mineral resource use, to state-based governance system 
which are defined by Mining Code and small-scale mining regulation.  
 
In order to be effective in solving the ASM challenges, multi-stakeholder agreements should 
be designed to cultivate collaborative relationships between stakeholders representing both 
regimes (Sarkis et al, 2010). Instead they have been used as tools to accelerate the transition 
and empower state-based institutions. According to the customary governance of natural 
resources, following a principle of unified rights for surface and mineral, the owner of land 
surface has mineral rights. Therefore, chiefs that have customary rights for land surface allow 
artisanal miners to lead their operations on their lands, considering that mineral rights go 
together with land rights.  
 
Customary resource use regime usually allows multiple uses of land, e.g. farming, fishing and 
mining (Di Gregorio et al, 2008). The interviews indicated that traditionally, the small-scale 
mining has been conducted at the same time or complimentary to farming activities and 
communities managed both mining and agricultural activities in the same area until the new 
regime of state-based governance challenged the multiple use of land. The state-based 
governance of the extractive sector excludes other uses in mineral rich areas and only allows 
mining activities on certain plots of land. This can be seen in relation to both registered 
concessions for small- and large-scale mining.  
 
By removing farmers from mining plots while deterring rural population from joining the 
informal small-scale mining sector, the regulators fail to provide alternative avenues of 
employment or unemployment protection. The sustainable livelihood programs aimed to 
protect the welfare of displaced farmers, but their success was one again faulted by the design 
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of alternatives without the adequate mechanism for engagement with local communities and 
customary authorities. Another facet of this discussions that should be integrated in multi-
stakeholder agreements is how to engage the surplus of skilled labor from the small-scale 
mining industry (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Hilson and Yakovleva (2007) observed that the 
government policies were not effectively addressing the issues of protection and employment 
of industry-skilled labor and thus many of them remained as miners informally. Alternative 
livelihood strategies in rural Ghana were initially perceived as an avenue to accommodate 
such labor surplus. However, most of them were unviable whereas the few cases that worked 
had limited scale-up potential (Banchirigah, 2008; Okoh and Hilson, 2011; Hilson and 
Banchirigah, 2009).  
 
It is evident the state strategies aimed at containing the informal mining sector and deterring 
the informal miners from accessing mineral resources. Agents that bought gold from small-
scale miners for the State Precious Metals and Minerals Commission did not discriminate 
against non-registered small-scale miners and continued to buy gold from unregistered 
miners. If the system was even further prohibitive of informal mining, it would lead to 
displacement of many thousands of workers from employment opportunities and income 
streams thus leading to negative social and economic effects in the mining areas of Ghana. 
Moreover, although there was a concern for negative environmental effects of small-scale 
mining with respect to the use of mercury, the control of mercury trade in the countries was 
not explored.  
 
The benefits for rural communities to engage with informal miners are shown in studies 
highlighting the increased rural incomes or second-income streams in the country (Okoh and 
Hilson, 2011). As the number of informal miners grew, as well as the understanding of the 
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sector, we saw that the attitudes towards the informal mining has changed. Galamsey are no 
longer seen as criminals, but the sector is still problematic and should be brought within the 
legal framework and monitored. Comparing the first interviews conducted in 2005 with those 
conducted at the end of 2008, there are some changes in the perception of various actors about 
the informal ASM.  
 “If you use the terminology of galamsey in this country, then it means people who are 
actually working on small-scale mining basis illegally.” (Government official 1, 2005) 
 
“Galamsey, they are informal miners because they are contributing to the informal 
economy, they buy good and equipment from local communities. You need to 
understand [that] in their culture, the land belongs to the community, even the chiefs 
do not own land” (Government official 4, 2008).  
 
There were instances when key actors in the sector considered collaboration between informal 
(and formal) small-scale miners and large-scale mining operators. In some later interviews 
there were institutional-level proposals to manage a double system for mineral concessions 
whereby small-scale miners could work on the surface for short periods of time, followed by 
mechanized large-scale mining operations that can take place in the same areas/   
“We have different galamsey operators. We have some who operate on the hard rock 
and others who mine on deep seated alluvial. But there is another type, who work only 
on the surface, the overburden, they call it ‘dig and wash’. This type of people are not 
interested in licence. The reason why they are not interested in licence, they go there 




If the ASM miners work for a short time on the surface, companies can allow them to work 
for certain periods of time, stipulating the conditions of operations (use of chemicals and 
machinery). Although the implementation of such proposals might be a long way ahead, the 
discussion of solutions different from total denial and exclusion could be the way forward for 
improved governance of the sector. Pluralist approach that is inclusive of informal miners, 
who are engaging in mining to escape poverty and supply rural communities with much 
needed developmental resources.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Table 4 summarizes the main factors influencing the success and failure of current 
governance solutions in the ASM sector in Ghana. In the circumstances when major actors in 
the ASM sector are confrontational, there are difficulties in building spaces for deliberation. 
The current governance framework in Ghana lack procedural justice mechanisms and 
therefore does not allow for promotion of open discussion and debate, inclusive of various 
parties in formal and informal sector who are operating in the same areas (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). As a consequence, multi-stakeholder agreements underpinned by the northern state-
and-market-centric perspective are largely ineffective to address the sector’s challenges and 
only respond to their donor’s agenda. In an attempt to address the challenges of the informal 
mining sector, one solution could be found in building a discussion by deliberating and 
listening to different actors, such as customary owners and users, informal supply chain 
operators, traditional chiefs and informal small-scale operators themselves.  
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





By opening the spaces for deliberation, future programs should focus on working to create co-
management solutions to focus on the following governance problems: 
• Exclusion of small-scale miners from access to mineral resources. 
• Entitlement and availability of land for ASM. 
• Distribution of benefits, prospection rights for ASM on par with large-scale mining 
sector. 
• Provision of financial and technical support to ASM. 
• System for monitoring unauthorised users. 
• Enforcement, such as implementation of viable alternatives to avoid violence and use 
of force. 
 
In addition to promoting public discussion, policy-makers could be considering alternative 
land regimes in the mining areas. Can there be avenues for forming and constructing a system 
of alternate uses on the same mineral concessions, whereby small-scale miners and large-scale 
miners can operate on same concession? Issues to consider are plenty: depth, periods and 
length of exploitation. How to control and regulate this system of alternate use? Can it be 
possible to combine agricultural activities or any other use of land? For instance, alternating 
small-scale mining with farming? Can they exist side by side? How to regulate this system? 
 
There are grassroots informal arrangements between large-scale mining companies and small-
scale miners, where they co-exist either as neighbours or latter tolerated as intruders as long 
as they do not cause significant obstruction to the mining companies. This indicates that there 
is a space for such co-existence. If this practice exists, can it be formalised and negotiated? 
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Can we see a future where small- and large-scale mining operators co-exist in the same area 
on the basis of negotiated agreements as an alternative to legislative reform? 
 
Our analysis highlights the problems faced by the initiatives that have attempted to regulate 
and address negative impacts within the informal mining sector. The design of these 
initiatives with the focus on formal regulation and technical assessment, exclusion of end-
users, informal rules and customary authorities from decision-making processes and the lack 
of suitable arenas for interaction, collective consultation and deliberation, have hindered their 
reach and significance. Future initiatives could be improved by reconsidering these top-down 
approaches to governance solutions. The framework of the analysis can be also applied to 
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Table 1. Multi-stakeholder initiatives in the ASM sector of Ghana 
Initiative What and why? The target Instruments Donor assessment 
Mining Sector Development and 
Environment Project 
 
Partners: World Bank (Donor), 
Minerals Commission Ghana  
 
Implementation 1995-2009 
Capacity building of the 
mining sector institutions 
and support of the small-
scale mining (SSM). The 
reason was the relative 
neglect of socio-
economic and 
environmental issues in 
the World Bank’s earlier 
interventions in the 
mining sector 
Mining sector 
institutions, the mines 
(the construction of a 
dam), the miners (health) 
Introduction of the new 




reclamation of land).  
Moderately satisfactory 
Small-Scale Mining Project  
 
Partners: GTZ (Donor), 
Ghanaian Government, Precious 
Metals and Minerals 




The provision of support 
to the SSM just after its 
legilization, because the 
mining sector required 
support after the 
legalization.   
The mining sector 
(emphasis on SSM) 
Improvement of 
technological aspect of 
existing mines; provision 
of new equipment; search 
for new areas to conduct 
for SSM 
Many objectives not met 
Prestea Action Plan 
 
Partners: Ghanaian Government, 
Mineral Development Fund, 
Communities and Artisanal 
Relocation of galamsey 
to suitable areas; 
improved organization of 
SSM in order to legalize 
their activities and foster 




new demarcated areas for 





Small-Scale Mining (CASM, 




greater engagement with 
galamsey 
Alternative Livelihood Projects 
(2005, ongoing) also including 
Local Economic Development 
Projects, umbrella title “Re-
Skilling Program” 
 
Partners: Ghanaian government 
and universities, OICI (an 
international NGO), 
Multinational companies (e.g. 
AngloGold Ashanti, Newmont) 
 
Example: Collaboration between 





To provide alternative 
livelihoods to galamsey 
in order to dissuade them 
from illegal mining and 
attract them to other 
activities such as 
farming. Belief that other 
activities can be more 
profitable and beneficial 
for the communities 
around mines.  
Galamsey and local 
communities around 
mines  
Training in other 
activities and business-
awareness training 
Disputed, less than 
satisfactory in several 
cases 
UNIDO Abatement of Mercury 
Pollution Program 
 
Partners UNIDO, Ghanaian 
government and Tanzanian 
government 
Assessing the impact of 
mercury on environment 
and human health, raising 
awareness, fostering 
better technologies 
Galamsey and the 
industry 




technical issues covered 
The organization of the 





Table 2. Current governance functions of the ASM sector 
Governance functions Application in the ASM sector in Ghana 
Exclusion of unathorised actors Registration of small scale miners 
Regulation of  authorized uses 
and distribution of their benefits 
Allocation of suitable land for small scale miners to 
operate. Prospection costs. 
Identification of health and safety and environmental 
risks, alternative technologies, land compensation, 
resettlement 
Provisioning and recovery of 
costs 
Financial and technical support 
Monitoring Mineral Commission Inspectors. Limited institutional 
capacity 
Enforcement Expulsion of of unregistered small scale miners from 
concessions 
Conflict resolution Alternative uses, mining excludes other land uses, large-
scale mining excludes small-scale.  
Collective choice  Spaces for dialogue between galamsey, government, 
industry and customary authorities. Inclusive decision-





Table 3. Interviews by type of actor 
Range of actors Interviews 
Government departments 11 
Small-scale miners and buyers 4 
NGOs* 5 
Large-scale mining companies and industry associations 6 
Total 26 




Table 4. Factors for success/failure of governance solutions in the ASM sector in Ghana 
Stage Level Factors 
Design of 
solutions 
Constitutional State-based vs. co-management governance system 
State-based governance is not an appropriate solution for 
Ghana. Co-management, multilevel governance is required 
when local knowledge and cooperation is a condition for 
success. 
Institutional Skills for deliberation 
No initiatives to promote institutions/skills that enable 
deliberation. 
Exclusion vs. inclusion 
Assumes that ‘unregistered’ can be excluded from 
governance solutions and these would still be viable. 
Operational Assessment of needs and capabilities 
Lack of assessment what works on the ground. 
Implementation 
of solutions 
 Consultation in decision-making: Top-down approach 
fails to interpret acceptance factors at operational levels 
(limited consultation with end users). 
Evidence and expertise in decision-making: Suspicion of 
‘quality of expertise’ by parties involved in 
implementation.  
Transparency of decision-making: Necessity to avoid 
limited transparency of decision-making. 
Progression of solutions: Focus on general advice is 
contested by participants and greater desire to seek 
specific solutions. 
 
